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THE FORESEEABILITY FACTOR IN THE
LAW OF TORTS
I.
Elasticity of Application
Probably the most powerful and most uniform social
policy crystallized in the various rules and doctrines of tort
law is to be found in the concept of foreseeability or ex-
pectability of certain harms from certain types of conduct.
The whole idea of risk or threat is comprehended in the
notion of foresight-foresight in the sense of the probability
of harm resulting from conduct. Experience suggests the
danger incident to certain activity. Not particular experi-
ence of particular individuals, but general experience-ex-
perience that often defies analysis-the multitude of factors,
knowledge, hunches, instincts or what they may be called,
the common sense that makes social intercourse possible,
all operate to prompt the "ordinary reasonable man" that
harms are "probable" or "natural" as normal results of
certain situations and certain conduct. Where harm is to
be anticipated, the problem of legal responsibility is raised.
Anticipation of harm, of course, is by no means the only
factor involved. Other aspects of social policy find crystal-
lization in other doctrinal developments. Even where the
actor has created risks, that is, has conducted himself in
such a way as to probably injure others, legal liability may
be wanting. Perhaps the injured party participated in the
creation of the risk.' Perhaps he assented, either to the
creation of the risk or to the actual injury.2 Perhaps the
1 See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS
(1926) 500.
2 If the plaintiff consented to the actual injury, he is, of course, barred from
a recovery, as a matter of policy, on the general theory that he cannot be heard
to complain. There is no invasion of his interest, if he consented thereto. If he
consented, not to the actual invasion of his interests, but to the conduct of the
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creation of the risk by the actor, although threatening fore-
seeable harm, was made under circumstances which, for rea-
sons of social policy, the law regards as privileged. Perhaps
the actual harm was privileged.' Or perhaps the risk cre-
ated, although threatening foreseeable harm, was not, on
the whole, unreasonable.4 Each of these policies outlined
finds its counterpart in a series of complicated rules of law,
the effect of which may be to insulate the actor from liabil-
ity for the creation of a situation which contains poten-
tiality of probable harm to others.
But the foreseeability factor is essential to liability.
Somewhere in the sequence of happenings, a defendant has
acted in a manner that threatened others, or there will be
no liability. In other words, while one may not be held
legally responsible merely because the harm caused was to
be anticipated, he is never held liable unless it was, in some
sense, foreseeable. Hence, it appears that it may be stated
as a major principle of the law of torts that there is no
liability unless the harm produced was, in some measure, to
be anticipated.
The application of the test of foreseeability, however,
requires a rather nice analysis. Harm may be foreseeable
defendant which created the risk, he may be barred on the theory that he volun-
tarily assumed the risk. See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 524.
3 The same distinction exists between the privilege for the actual invasion
of interest and the privilege to indulge in the conduct which creates a risk, that
exists between consent and voluntary assumption of risk. The former type of
privilege exists in such cases as self defense, arrest under warrant, seizure of
goods under process, etc. The latter type exists when certain types of conduct,
ordinarily the basis of liability, are legalized by statute or customary law, e. g.,
legal authority to engage in conduct which, but for the statute would be the
basis for the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1886); Madras R.
Co. v. Semindar of Carvatenagarum, L. R. 1 Indian App. Cases 364 (1874); or
statutory authority to engage in conduct which, but for the statute, would be a
nuisance. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. 45, 33 Am. Rep. 73 (1879). The
point to be made here is that both types of consent, as well as both variations
of privilege are grounded on the same idea of social policy.
4 See the treatment of the negligence problem by the AMERICAN LAW IN-
STITUTE, RESTATEMENT OP THE LAW oF TORTS, TENTATivE DRAFT No. 4, §§ 172
to 175. And see Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. Rxv. 40, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE LAW Or TORTS, 261.
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in several senses and much confusion is to be found in the
cases from a sloppy use of the idea. In the first place,
the particular injury or damage may be foreseeable in the
sense that, not only the exact person injured was foreseen
to have been exposed to the risk, but the precise manner in
which the injury happened was to be reasonably appre-
hended. Again, while the exact way in which the injury
occurred may not be foreseeable, the general type of injury
may be reasonably foreseeable, as well as the general class
of persons threatened. Although it is by no means necessary
that the precise sequence of events be the subject of reason-
able foresight, it is necessary that the general sort of interest
invaded and the general class of persons injured be fore-
seeable before there can be legal liability. The former ques-
tion is a problem of legal causation, and the foreseeability
of the precise train of happenings is not always essential
to liability. But the latter two questions go to distinctly
different problems, namely, the character of the conduct
upon which legal liability shall be predicated, and it is sub-
mitted that liability is never predicated upon conduct which
did not threaten the general type of injury complained of
to the general class of persons injured, in the sense that
some such injury to some such persons could be foreseen
as probable.
Such an analysis, to be sure, cannot be made to operate
automatically or mechanically. It cannot serve as a sub-
stitute for the exercise of the judgment forming faculties.
The concept is an elastic one. It may, to use Justice Car-
dozo's phrase, "expand or shrink." The "general type of
harm" and the "general class of persons" threatened, quite
obviously must include or exclude many situations today
which were outside or within their purview yesterday. Ex-
perience and particular aspects of social life will determine
the scope and range of such concepts and circumstances
will always affect their applicability. There is, however,
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value to be derived from such analysis. It reveals a great
and uniform principle of policy-the policy to confine legal
liability in tort to situations in which a man's conduct
created some foreseeable danger to a foreseeable part of
society. Unless his conduct can be characterized in such a
way, it is never a basis of legal responsibility.
H.
Foreseeability of the Harmw" Threatened
Neither in the case of intended invasions nor of negligent
invasions of another's interests, nor yet when the invasion
is the result of extra-hazardous conduct, is the actor liable
unless his conduct created a general type of foreseeable
danger. Nor is he liable for any injury not within the gen-
eral class of harm threatened. In other words, there can
never be a recovery in tort for an injury which was not
of the general class of harms, the foreseeable danger of
which made the actor's conduct the basis of liability.
In the case of intended invasions, the operation of this
policy is somewhat obscured by its very obviousness, quite
as the principles of legal causation are obscured by their
obvious application. Even in the case of intended wrongs,
a defendant is liable only for harms legally caused, but one
of the first rules of legal causation is that intended con-
sequences are always regarded as proximate ' and the rea-
sons of policy for such rule are so patent that they need
no discussion. Similarly, the limitation that only harms
which come within the general class of injuries that made
the conduct dangerous can be the subject of recovery, is
consistent with the rule of liability for intended wrongs, for
it is the threat of "intended wrongs" that makes the actor's
conduct tortious. The application of both general limita-
tions of liability is thus comparatively simple in the case
5 RESTATEMTENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, TENTATIVE DRAFT, No. 1, § 6,
Comment.
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of intended wrongs, for the reason that intended invasions
of one's interests are both "legal consequences" and the
"general class of harms," the apprehension of which makes
the conduct unreasonably dangerous. When a man engages
in conduct intended to inflict injury upon another, it is to
be anticipated that certain harms will result therefrom, and
his liability therefore is no exception to the policy that there
is no liability in tort for injuries that are not, in a general
way, expectable.
In the case of negligent conduct, the same policy is to be
found running through the law. There is no liability for
"negligence in the air." ' A defendant must be negligent
with respect to the general type of harm of which the plain-
tiff complains or there can be no liability. Thus, if the de-
fendant has created an unreasonable risk toward the plain-
tiff's property interests, such conduct is not negligent toward
the plaintiff's interest in his personal safety' and there can
be no recovery therefore because such a harm was not the
sort of hazard, the anticipation of which made defendant's
conduct the basis of liability. Thus where a defendant was
charged with negligence in failing to keep a cattle pen
properly locked and the cattle, frightened by a passing train,
stampeded and crashed through a gate injuring the plaintiff
and damaging his property, the court held the defendant
liable for the plaintiff's property damage, as the likelihood
of such a harm made the defendant's conduct unreasonable.
There was, however, no liability for the plaintiff's personal
injuries because such a harm was not of the general class
of hazards which made defendant's conduct the basis of
liability.' Such a thing was not reasonably foreseeable. And,
in another case, where plaintiff sought to recover damages
for the diminution of the value of his house by reason of
6 See Cardozo, C. J., in Palsgraph v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339,
162 N. E. 99 (1928).
7 See RESTATEmy.NT, § 165.
8 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bighan, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896),
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a murder committed therein by defendant by reason of
which the plaintiff's family refused to live therein, there
was no liability. This sort of damage was entirely outside
the general type of harm which made defendant's conduct
unlawful.9
The clearest working of this policy, of course, is to be
ascertained from cases in which liability is based upon de
fendant's breach of statutory duty. If the general class of
harms which the statute sought to protect against dnes not
include the harm of which plaintiff complains, there can be
no recovery." ° Where, for example, a statute forbade a
railroad company from blocking a public crossing and the
plaintiff by reason of such blocking was prevented from
seeing a switch engine which struck and injured him, there
could be no recovery against the railroad merely because of
the violation of the statute. The general sort of risk to be
anticipated from such conduct and the one sought to be
avoided by the statute was the delay and inconvenience to
traffic,-not obstruction of view. Since injuries of the type
resulting from the latter effect were not reasonably to be
anticipated and not the sort of thing which made defend-
ant's conduct unlawful, there could be no recovery."
Herein lies the explanation for much of the confusion in
the development of the principles of legal causation. The
courts have for centuries persisted in stating and purporting
to apply the "natural and probable consequences" formula
to determine whether consequences were proximate to con-
duct. Many still insist that there can be no recovery if the
injuries complained of were not reasonably foreseeable. It
would be most astonishing that such a formula should per-
sist for so long if there were no validity whatever to it.
9 Clark v. Gay, 112 Ga. 777, 38 S. E. 81 (1901).
10 See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317,
SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF TORTS, 276.
11 Denton v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 90 Kan. 51, 133 Pac. 558, 47 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 820 (1913).
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The secret is revealed by the frequent qualification of the
rule that the exact manner in which the injuries occurred
need not be foreseeable. The explanation is that the courts
are perfectly accurate in declaring that there can be no
liability where the injuries were unforeseeable, if "foresee-
ability" refers to the general type of harm sustained. It is
perfectly true that there is no liability for injuries or damage
that falls entirely outside the general threat of harm which
made the conduct of the actor negligent. The sequence of
events, of course, need not be foreseeable. The manner in
which the risk culminates in harm may be unusual, improb-
able and highly unexpectable, from the point of view of the
actor, at the time of his conduct. And yet, if the general
result suffered falls within the danger area, there may be
liability, providing other requisites of legal causation are
present.
It should be observed that while non-liability for harms
completely outside the general threat is a correct state-
ment of the result, to couch the rule in terms of legal
causation is not a desirable analysis of the problem. It is
rather a lack of analysis. Legal causation is better confined
solely to the problem presented by the sequence of events
leading up to the injury. Where the actor's liability is pred-
icated upon his negligent conduct, the question of whether
the harm sustained falls within or outside the general class
of harms which made the conduct negligent may be treated
more conveniently as an aspect of the negligence problem,
and it has been so treated by the American Law Institute
in its Restatement of Negligence. 2
Where the actor's conduct is of the third type upon which
tort liability is predicated, conduct which is extra-hazardous
although neither intended to invade the interests of others
nor negligent with respect to such interests, it is significant
12 See RESTATEmENT, § 165.
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that the same principle of liability is observed by the com-
mon law. Only those harms which come within the general
"extra" hazards threatened may be the subject of recovery.
The coordinating policies of the law are particularly striking
in this area. The actor is held liable here not upon the
obvious moral ground that one who intentionally invades
the interests of another should be required to compensate
the injured person; nor yet upon the social ground that
when one has acted unreasonably with respect to others, he
should make good the loss occasioned thereby. Liability
"without fault," as it were, is imposed upon grounds that
are purely socio-economic, upon the theory that one who
so conducts himself as to create certain unusual risks to-
ward others, for his own advantage, should do so at his
peril as the price of his social privilege of carrying on the
dangerous activity. The activity is not, of itself, negligence,
for, although it involves foreseeable risks to others, still such
threats are not unreasonable by virtue of the social utility
and community benefits of the enterprise. Nevertheless,
such social benefits and individual privileges may not be
created at the risk of the unfortunate individuals who hap-
pen, sometimes by accident, to be within the danger zone.
Those most benefited must therefore carry such risks. This
means, the actor, immediately and society indirectly, must
make good the loss, and such extra hazardous conduct is a
common basis for tort liability.
Now, once such risk has actually materialized into harm,
the injured person may recover providing, of course, all
other requisites of legal liability are present. But what here
concerns us is the policy that restricts recovery to those
harms of the general class which made the conduct of the
actor the basis of liability. The harm must come within the
general risk area the anticipation of which prompted the
rule of extra-hazardous liability, for only in this way could
the original policy of the law be observed and made effective.
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Thus the keeping of animals known to be vicious, whether
because of their wild nature or whether due to the particular
characteristics of the particular beast, is conduct which falls
within the common law rule of liability for extra-hazardous
conduct. But such conduct is dangerous only because of a
certain general type of hazard, and no other harm resulting
from such conduct will support a recovery.3 The same rule
applies to harm caused by domestic animals. The common
law rule predicated liability upon the keeping of cattle be-
cause of a definite and rather narrow type of risk, viz., the
escape and consequent trespasses of such animals by reason
of their wandering propensities. 4 But the owner of such cat-
tle was not responsible for harms outside this general class of
risk which constituted the hazard anticipated. 5 Similar
results are to be found in other phases of strict liability,
such as nuisance 6 and liability for blasting."
The foreseeability of harm is, it seems, a factor of vital
importance in all phases of tort liability. If the harm com-
plained of was unexpectable in the sense that it is entirely
outside the general sort of risk which made the actor's
conduct the basis of liability, and was, therefore, not harm
of a sort, the anticipation of which gave rise to the rule
or principle of law invoked, there is no social policy to be
13 Osborne v. Chocqueel [18963 L. R. 2 Q. B. 109; Scribner v. Kelly, 38
Barb. 14 (1862).
14 See PoLLOcx, THE LAW Or ToRTS, 13th ed., 514.
15 See COOLEY ON TORTS, 403; Hadwell v. Righten [1907] 2 K. B. 345;
Cox v. Burbage, 13 C. B. N. S. 430 (1863).
16 Robinson v. Kilvert [1889] L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 88.
17 Where liability was denied, especially by the older cases, for damage due
to concussions of the atmosphere alone. See Booth v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 140
N. Y. 267, 35 N E. 592 (1893). Blasting was not regarded as extra-hazardous
because of the danger of this sort of thing, but solely because of the hazard to
person or property from tangible substances. The more modern rule seems to
proceed from the view that damage to adjoining property resulting from concus-
sions of the atmosphere ought to be as much within the general threat from blasting
as damage from actual invasions of physical substances. See Johnson, J., in Hicky
v. McCabe, 30 R. I. 346, 75 Atl. 404 (1910). Thus the foreseeability of harm
was expanded to enlarge the general type of risk which made the blaster's conduct.
the basis of liability.
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advanced by holding the actor liable."8 So far as the law is
concerned, the harm was caused entirely by accident of a
kind that there is no point in putting the loss elsewhere than
upon the person upon whom it unfortunately falls.
III.
Foreseeability of the Person Threatened
Tort law, like all other legal phenomena, is entirely social
in the sense that the actor is liable only when his conduct
has resulted in harm to others. If there are no injurious
consequences, in the legal sense, his conduct entails no lia-
bility. On the other hand, there is never liability in tort
for harms caused unless the actor had voluntarily engaged
in a course of conduct which is made the basis of legal
liability. 9 Both "tortious" conduct 20 and harm legally re-
sulting therefrom must concur before there is liability.
But it is to be noticed that certain types of conduct are
made the basis of liability because of the probability of
certain injurious consequences to certain persons. Risk or
danger implies an object as well as a subject, and a risk
is created only when there is a threat of harm to somebody.
And so the social policy that bases liability upon certain
types of conduct, does so both because a general class of
harm is created and because the harm threatens a general
18 The harm may be "actual" or "constructive," but it must always be
"legal damage." Some harms are not the subject of compensation because the
interest actually invaded is not., for practical reasons, accorded legal protection.
See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577 (1861). Here there is actual harm, but no
"legal damage." Again an interest may be protected, also for practical reasons,
to the extent of allowing recovery for "legal damage" although there is, in fact,
no actual harm, as in the case of "nominal" damages for "technical" trespass.
19 See the development of the policy that tort liability is only imposed as
a price of voluntary activity or relations voluntarily assumed, by Professor Bohlen
in STUDIES IN THE LAW Or ToRTs, 33, 67, 109.
20 Not necessarily wrongful conduct. By "tortious" conduct is merely meant
conduct which, if harm is legally caused, and other requisites of legal liability
are present, will support a civil action for damages. In the case of extra-hazardous
activity, the conduct is "tortious" in this sense, although not prohibited by law
and not morally nor socially reprehensible.
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class of persons. This policy is carried out completely by
confining recovery to injured persons of this general class
imperiled, and no one else, as to whom there was no fore-
seeable danger, can recover.
Again, the applicability of this policy to the type of in-
juries characterized as intended invasions of one's interests,
is somewhat obscured. Upon analysis, however, it appears
that such species of conduct is unsocial because of the danger
to certain classes of persons and only such persons may
recover. For the most part, the general class of persons
threatened by the kind of conduct which in these cases is
the basis of liability, is the person or persons whom the
actor intends to injure. But it is to be remembered that
"intended" has here a somewhat weighted meaning. It is
unaffected by the motive of the actor or by a mistake on
his part as to either the identity of the person whom he
intended to harm or the existence of circumstances which,
had they in fact existed, would have privileged the actor
to invade the other's interests.
Such persons, however, are not the only ones imperiled
by conduct "intended" to injure, for when a person engages
in such activity, it is not improbable that others may also
be threatened. Accordingly, anyone within the danger zone
thus created may recover. If A shoots at B, intending to
injure him, but the ball strikes C, it is clear that A is liable
criminally to the state for the assault and battery upon C
and civilly to C for the harm inflicted.2 Various theories
and fictions are sometimes advanced to rationalize the re-
sult as an "intended" invasion of C's interests, but it is
clear that the hazards involved in the actor's attempt to
intentionally injure one person are so great toward others
in the zone of danger that the policy of the law requires
that the actor make good the harm thus caused. The more
21 Anderson v. Arnold, 79 Ky. 370 (1881); Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va.
578, 104 S. E. 800 (1920).
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rational ground of tort liability in such cases would seem
to be the negligence of the actor toward persons other than
the one against whom the assault was directed. Thus where
a defendant threw a stone at one boy and struck another
close by, he was liable to the person actually injured, for the
intended assault upon the one person constituted a risk of
harm that was foreseeable and unreasonable toward the
plaintiff.2" Frequently it is said that such a result to the
person injured was the "natural and probable" consequence
of the conduct intended to injure a third person,2" which
is to say that it is foreseeable that third persons within the
area of danger may be injured by an intended attack upon
another, and such conduct is, therefore, negligence toward
the former. It is submitted that there is no civil liability
to one who, at the time the actor attempts an intended in-
vasion of a third person's interests, was not within the zone
of apprehended peril.
Other situations in which liability is predicated on the
defendant's negligence illustrate the principle further. To
support a recovery, it must appear that the actor's conduct
created an unreasonable risk toward the plaintiff or persons
in his position.' In other words, the plaintiff must show
that the actor's conduct was such as to create a foreseeable
hazard toward a general class of persons of which the plain-
tiff is one. Again, the operation of the principle is most
clearly observed in cases involving a breach of statutory
duty. The statute creates certain duties toward certain
persons for their protection against anticipated harms. Not
only must the harm actually sustained be such as was of
the general class which the statute was designed to protect
22 Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130, 26 Am. Rep. 81 (1877).
23 See Bannister v. Mitchell, op. cit. supra note 21.
24 Palsgraph v. Long Island R. Co., op. cit. supra note 6, per Cardozo, C. J.;
Hoag v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653 (1817); Wood
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 Atl. 699 (1896). And see GRFmr, RA-
TIONALE OF PROXnATE CAUSE, 85ff.
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against, but the plaintiff must show that the actor's breach
of the statute was a wrong toward him. "A violation of a
statutory duty," observed Judge Mitchell in a Minnesota
case, "can be made the foundation of an action only by
the person belonging to the class intended to be protected
by such regulation and.., such statutes were never intended
to abrogate the ordinary rules that to recover, the neglected
duty must have been due to the party injured." The failure
to comply with the statute is a breach of duty only toward
such persons as to whom the legislature anticipated harm
and accordingly sought to protect.
And finally, it appears that in situations in which the
defendant's liability for harm caused is predicated upon his
extra-hazardous activity, the principle that only persons who,
in the general sense, were foreseeably exposed to the extra
hazards can recover. It is hardly to be supposed that had
the plaintiff, in Rylands v. Fletcher,26 owned land so far
from the location of the defendant's reservoir that no one
could foresee danger to his interests even if the reservoir
should burst, there could have been a recovery against the
defendant. The "absolute duty," as Lord Blackburn de-
scribed the defendant's relation to the plaintiff, was owing
the plaintiff as an adjoining landowner, and he would be re-
quired to bring himself within this general class of persons,
in order to invoke liability for a breach of such "absolute"
duty. Only such persons were exposed to the extra hazards
which were the basis of the defendant's liability and only
such persons could recover for damage sustained.
Again, workmen's compensation liability is imposed by
reason of the foreseeable injuries to workmen caused by
"accident arising out of and in the course of" their employ-
ment. To invoke such statutory strict liability, not only
must the plaintiff show that the injury complained of was
25 Akers v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 60 N. W. 669 (1894).
26 Op. cit. supra note 3.
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of the general class of harms the anticipation of which made
the employer's activity the basis of liability,27 but he must
show that he is a member of the general class of persons
as to whom the threatened peril was the subject of legisla-
tive concern. First of all, of course, he must show that he
was an employee, for the danger to employees was the
foreseeable harm subject to compensation. An independent
contractor, for example, cannot recover,2 8 nor employees
of independent contractors.2 9 Again, the statutes usually
eliminate certain kinds of employees from the benefits of
the act, so that if the plaintiff was a mere "casual" worker,
he cannot recover compensation."
The same limitation of liability is found in the cases
wherein the actor's conduct consisted in the harboring of
dangerous animals. Such conduct is made the basis of lia-
bility because of anticipated harm toward a certain class
of persons, to which a felonious trespasser, for example,
does not belong. Anticipation of harm toward such a person
is in no sense a reason for imposing strict liability upon the
keeper of vicious animals and there can be, accordingly, no
recovery by such a person.3
Once again, it appears that the foreseeability standard is
of the greatest significance in determining the limitation
27 That is, he must show that his injury was of the general class, described
as an "accident" received "in the course of the employment." The statutory
provision that the "accident" must "arise out of the employment" refers, not to
the general type of injury sustained, but to the causal relation between the
employer's conduct (the operation of the industrial plant) and the injury.
See In Re McNicols, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913), and Brown, Arising
out of and in the course of the Employment in Workmen's Compensation Acts,
7 WIs. L. RFv. (1931) 14.
28 Vamplew v. Parkgate Iron & Steel Co. [1903] L. R. 1 K. B. 851, 72 L.
J. K. B. N. S. 575; In re Pheinwald, 168 App. Div. 425, 153 N. Y. S. 598 (1915).
29 Kennedy v. David Kauffman & Sons Co., 91 Atl. 99 (N. J. 1914), and
see cases collected in L. R. A. 1918 F, 206 and Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 709. Contra,
under the Massachusetts Statute, Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 4.33
(1914).
30 Baer's Express & S. Co. v. Industrial Bd., 282 Il1. 44, 118 N. E. 412
(1917); Cheever's Case, 219 Mass. 244, 106 N. E. 861 (1914); Bridger v. Lincoln
Feed & Fuel Co., 105 Neb. 222, 179 N. W. 1020 (1920).
31 See Wolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 (1862).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
and scope of the various rules of tort liability. Throughout
the entire ambit of tort law, the anticipation of harm of a
general sort to persons of a general class, is a determinative
factor. Here, it seems, is a principle of policy that is so
deeply imbedded in the law that it may fairly be said to be a
"fundamental" principle-not fundamental in a dogmatic
or doctrinal sense, but fundamental in the sense that it
represents an approximately universal sense of fairness and
social justice, deep rooted in human thinking.
May it not be that whereas the long sought "system" of
tort law, not discovered in the artificialities of procedure
and forms of action, nor yet in the logical organization of
doctrinal generalizations, may yet be found in a few com-
paratively simple formulations of social policy which seem
consciously and unconsciously, to have pushed the judges
in the right direction for these many centuries. If such a
formulation of somewhat general notions of social policy
can be made, it seems pretty clear that the general concept
of the foreseeability of harm, the idea of a general threat
to a general class of persons, will occupy a conspicuous
place in the rational organization of tort law.
Fowler Vincent Harper.
Indiana University, School of Law.
